Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics by PIERSON, Paul
4A
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
The Robert Schum an Centre
Increasing Returns, 
Path Dependence and 



























































































































































































Jean Monnet Chair Papers





























































































Jean Monnet Chair Papers
44
The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 



























































































Jean Monnet Chair Papers
Increasing Returns,
Path Dependence and the Study of Politics
Paul P ierson
1997




























































































WP 3 2 0  
EUR
All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
©Paul Pierson 
Printed in Italy in June 1997 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 






























































































I. The Distinctiveness of Increasing Returns Processes p. 11
II. Path Dependence Arguments in Economics p. 13
III. Moving From Economics to Politics:
The Applicability of Path Dependence Arguments p. 23























































































































































































“No decade in the history of politics, religion, technology, 
painting, poetry and what not ever contains its own explanation. 
In order to understand the religious events from 1520 to 1530, 
or the political events from 1790 to 1800, or the developments 
in painting from 1900 to 1910, you must survey a period of 
much wider span. Not to do so is the hallmark of dilettantism." 
Joseph Schumpeter (1946)
“There simply are no logical or even methodological distinc­
tions between the social sciences and history - appropriately 























































































































































































It is increasingly common for social scientists to describe political processes 
as “path dependent.” Although often presented without careful elaboration, the 
notion of path dependence is generally used to support a few key claims: that 
specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; that a wide range of social 
outcomes are often possible, and large consequences may result from rela­
tively small and contingent events; that particular courses of action, once 
introduced, are often virtually difficult or impossible to reverse even if their 
consequences prove to be disastrous; and that consequently, political develop­
ment is punctuated by critical moments or junctures which shape the basic 
contours of social life2. All of these features stand in sharp contrast to promi­
nent modes of argument and explanation in political science, which emphasize 
the prevalence of unique, predictable political outcomes, the irrelevance of 
small or accidental events, and the capacity of rational actors to design optimal 
solutions (given their resources and constraints) to the problems that confront 
them. If path dependence arguments are indeed appropriate in substantial areas 
of political life, they will shake many subfields of political analysis. This essay 
argues that they are.
My analysis begins by outlining, in abstract terms, the basic characteristics 
of increasing returns processes which are the source of path dependence. 
While it will be immediately apparent that these characteristics carry consider­
able implications for political science, a full discussion of those implications 
will be postponed until later in the paper. In Part II, I consider the develop­
ment of path dependence arguments in the social science discipline where they 
have received the greatest attention: economics. This review suggests the wide 
sweep of potential applications, even in a field that might be expected to be
1 Jean Monnet Visiting Professor Lecture, European University Institute. An earlier 
version of this paper was prepared for presentation at the American Political Science 
Association meetings, San Francisco, September 1996. I am very grateful to Andy 
Rudalevige for his extensive research assistance on this project, and to the German 
Marshall Foundation for financial support. I have received helpful comments on earlier 
versions from David Collier, Andrew Moravcsik, and Alec Stone, and have benefited 
from discussions at the EUI, the University of California at Berkeley, and Yale 
University.




























































































hostile to the idea3. More important, these economic applications provide the 
most analytically-developed discussions of path dependence. Economists have 
successfully highlighted both the aspects of a particular social environment that 
generate path dependence and clarified its principal implications.
This discussion of economics prepares the way for an exploration of the 
distinctive characteristics of politics (Part III). Rather than simply applying 
extant arguments in economics to political phenomena, we need to consider the 
features of the political world that require appropriate modifications in the use 
of path dependence claims. From this discussion I conclude that path depen­
dence arguments are likely to be even more relevant to an understanding of 
politics than they are in other areas of the social sciences. Factors such as the 
greater ambiguity of political processes and outcomes, the central role of for­
mal, change-resistant institutions, and the prominence of collective activity in 
politics make this a domain of social life which is particularly prone to the 
characteristic tendencies of path dependent processes.
In the final section of the paper I discuss what path dependence arguments 
can and cannot contribute to political analysis. There are important limits. For 
many purposes, analysts will want to continue to take historical circumstances 
as “givens”, analyzing how current environmental conditions produce current 
political outcomes. The difficulties involved in developing path dependence 
arguments will also mean that in many cases a sensitivity to path dependence 
will serve primarily a “negative” purpose - hat is, as an important caution 
against a too easy conclusion of the inevitability, “naturalness”, or functional­
ity of observed outcomes.
Given the ubiquity of claims about efficient or functional elements in poli­
tics, this alone would be an important corrective. Yet path dependence argu­
ments can do more. They can direct attention toward particular variables, and 
generate promising hypotheses about the sources of particular political phe­
nomena. At least as important, by stretching the temporal horizons of political 
analysts, they can reorient both the answers given and the questions asked in 
ways that contribute to a richer appreciation of the sources of variation in
3 Indeed, an additional reason for focusing on economics, the traditional homeland of 
equilibrium analysis, is rhetorical. Because the arguments presented here raise difficulties 
for those drawn to models emphasizing unique equilibria in social processes (e.g., many 
rational choice theorists), demonstrating the growing acceptance of “increasing returns” 





























































































political life. Finally, they can help orient political scientists to a realistic - 
which is to say modest - set of aspirations regarding the possibilities for 
achieving parsimony and predictability in the study of politics.
I. The Distinctiveness of Increasing Returns Processes
Imagine a very large urn containing two balls, one black, one red4. You 
remove one ball, and then return it to the urn, accompanied by a new ball of 
the same color. You repeat this process, say, until the urn fills up. What can 
we say about the eventual distribution of colored balls in the urn? Or about a 
series of trials in which we fill the urn and then start over again one hundred 
times?
- for each individual trial we have no idea what the eventual ratio of red to 
black balls will be; it could be 99.9% red, or 0.01% red, or anything in 
between. If we were to run 100 trials, we could easily get 100 different out­
comes.
- on any individual trial, the ratio will eventually reach an equilibrium. 
Since later draws in a particular series contribute only minutely to the distri­
bution of balls in the urn, the distribution settles down onto a stable path.
- sequence is thus crucial. Early draws in each trial, which have a consider­
able random element, have a crucial effect on which of the possible equilibria 
will actually emerge.
Mathematicians call this a Polya urn process. Its characteristic qualities stem 
from the fact that an element of chance (or accident) is combined with a deci­
sion rule linking current probabilities to the outcomes of preceding (partly 
random) sequences5. It is a process where history matters.
4 The following discussion relies heavily on Arthur 1994, which collects Arthur’s ground­
breaking essays on increasing returns and path dependence. When citing a particular es­
say from this collection, I have placed the date of original publication in brackets.
5 This case depicts a very specific type of path dependent process, where the probability of 
a particular “draw” precisely equals the ratio between the two alternatives in the existing 
population. Arthur (1994) has shown that many of the features of this case have a greater 




























































































Polya urn processes exhibit increasing returns or positive feedback. Each 
step along a particular path produces consequences which make that path more 
attractive for the next round. If such effects begin to accumulate, they generate 
a powerful virtuous (or vicious) cycle of self-reinforcing activity. Brian 
Arthur (1994) has summarized the main characteristics of increasing return 
dynamics as follows:
1. Unpredictability. Because early events have a big impact and are partly 
random, many outcomes may be possible. We cannot predict ahead of time 
which of many possible end-states will be reached.
2. Inflexibility. The further into the process we are, the harder it becomes 
to shift from one path to another. In applications to technology, a given sub­
sidy to a particular technique will be more likely to shift the ultimate outcome 
if it occurs early rather than later. Sufficient movement down a particular path 
may eventually “lock-in” one solution6.
3. Non-ergodicity. This mouthful means that individual, accidental events 
do not cancel out. They cannot be treated (which is to say, ignored) as “noise.” 
Instead they are fed back into future choices. Small events are remembered.
4. Potential Path-Inefficiency. The outcome that becomes locked-in may not 
in fact generate higher pay-offs than a foregone alternative over the long run. 
In this case, the process may be called path-inefficient.
To this one can add a general point, which is that these are processes where 
sequencing may be critical. Early events, including “noise”, matter much more 
than later ones. Different sequences produce different outcomes.
In the last part of the paper, I will argue that these characteristics carry 
major implications for both the kinds of questions we should ask about poli­
tics, and the kinds of answers we should expect to find. Most important, they 
suggest the need to think of social processes, including political ones, as fun­
damentally historical in nature. Politics occurs in time, and political outcomes 
are the result of temporal processes. In searching for explanation, we need to
6 This emerging stability represents a critical distinction between increasing returns pro­
cesses and chaotic processes which may generate no stable equilibrium and instead con­





























































































think about causes and effects that are often separated in time, rather than 
focusing exclusively on synchronic explanations (Skocpol 1992; Pierson 1996).
II. Path Dependence Arguments in Economics7
Economics has traditionally focused on the search for unique equilibria. 
The goal was attractive, because it suggested a world of potential predictability 
and efficiency. Given a knowledge of existing factor endowments and prefer­
ences, equilibrium analysis would point to a single optimal outcome.
Moreover, because economists assumed a context of decreasing marginal 
returns, this goal was potentially achievable. With decreasing returns, eco­
nomic actions will engender negative feedback, leading to a predictable equi­
librium. A sharp rise in oil prices leads to increased conservation, exploration, 
and exploitation of other sources of energy, leading to a fall in oil prices. Each 
step away from equilibrium is more difficult than the one before. As Arthur 
(1994 [1990], p.l) summarizes, negative “feedback tends to stabilize the econ­
omy because any major changes will be offset by the very reactions they gen­
erate. ... the equilibrium marks the ‘best’ outcome possible under the circum­
stances: the most efficient use and allocation of resources.”
During the past decade, however, this decreasing returns tradition has faced 
a mounting challenge. Economists have exhibited a growing interest in the idea 
of increasing returns. On a wide range of subjects, including the spatial loca­
tion of production, the development of international trade, the causes of eco­
nomic growth and the emergence of new technologies, path dependence argu­
ments have become increasingly prevalent.
7 Some social scientists also have been drawn to arguments about path dependence, critical 
junctures, and punctuated equilibria in evolutionary biology, especially the work of 
Stephen J. Gould (see especially Krasner 1989; Spruyt 1994). Without denying the rele­
vance of this literature, I find it a less useful point of departure than the economists’ focus 
on increasing returns. Most aspects of politics lack anything like the mechanism of natu­
ral selection which drives Darwinian theory (international relations, and certain character­
istics of electoral systems constitute important exceptions). Furthermore, socially-created 
constructs of norms and formal institutions have no real analog in evolutionary theory. 
Norms and formal institutions, however, are crucial features of politics and, as we shall 




























































































Many of the ideas developed in this research are not entirely new. The con­
cept of increasing returns received attention in the work of Adam Smith and 
(especially) Alfred Marshall. In the 20th century, an underground of 
“institutionalist” scholarship, including figures such as Kaldor, Myrdall, and 
Veblen, continued to explore these issues (Kaldor 1972; Myrdal 1978; Veblen 
1898). Yet in the past few years, prominent mainstream economists have em­
braced the idea of path dependence. Their work has received considerable 
attention in leading journals. Douglass North, who places great emphasis on 
such arguments in his analysis of the development of modem capitalism, was 
recently awarded the Nobel Prize for economics.
I focus first on arguments about technology, because these have provided 
the most fertile ground for exploring the conditions conducive to increasing 
returns. I then briefly discuss developments in other areas of economics to 
show the growing range of applications, including North’s crucial contribu­
tions. Finally, I consider some recent criticisms. This discussion will provide a 
transition to the analysis of political phenomena developed in Sections III and 
IV.
Work on technological change has revealed some of the factors which pro­
mote path dependence. As Brian Arthur and Paul David have argued, under 
certain conditions a single technology may achieve a decisive advantage over 
competitors, even though it is not necessarily the most efficient one in the 
long-run (Arthur 1994; David 1985). Once the initial advantage is gained, 
however, feedback effects may lock in this technology, excluding other alter­
natives.
Figure 1, taken from Arthur’s work, summarizes the process. Each tech­
nology improves (generates higher payoffs) as it becomes increasingly preva­
lent. In other words, these technologies are subject to increasing returns. 
Because technology B starts with lower payoffs, however, early users gravitate 
to technology A. This movement activates the increasing returns process, 
improving the performance of technology A, inducing more new users to 
adopt it, and widening the gap between technology A and B. Eventually tech­
nology A becomes locked in, even though technology B would have generated 





























































































Figure 1: Adoption Payoffs
j | Option A |  Option B
As in other formulations of path dependence the crucial idea here is that of 
increasing returns. If a new technology is subject to increasing returns, being 
the fastest out of the gate (if only for reasons of historical accident) becomes 
key. With increasing returns, there are strong incentives for actors to focus on 
a single alternative, and to continue moving down a specific path once initial 
steps are taken in that direction.
Crucially, Arthur has addressed not only the characteristics of path depen­
dent processes, but the conditions which are likely to give rise to them. He 
offers a short list of the conditions which make a technology prone to increas­
ing returns. Understanding these conditions is essential for the broader con­
cerns of this paper, because as we shall see in Section III, analytically similar 
circumstances occur frequently in the world of politics.
Arthur argues that four features of a technology and its social context gen­
erate increasing returns:
(1) Large set-up or fixed costs. These create a high pay-off for further 
investments in a given technology. By moving to larger production runs, fixed 




























































































or fixed costs are high, individuals and organizations have a strong incentive 
to identify and stick with a single option.
(2) Learning effects. Knowledge gained in the operation of complex systems 
also lead to higher returns from continuing use. With repetition, individuals 
learn how to use products more effectively, and their experiences are likely to 
spur further innovations in the product or in related activities.
(3) Coordination effects. These occur when the individual receives 
increased benefits from a particular activity if others also adopt the same 
option. If technologies embody positive network externalities, a technology 
will become more attractive as more people use it. This enhanced appeal 
attracts more users, reinforcing the existing advantage. Coordination effects 
are especially significant when a technology has to be compatible with a linked 
infrastructure (e.g., software with hardware, automobiles with an infrastruc­
ture of repair facilities and gas stations).
(4) Adaptive expectations. Individuals may feel a need to “pick the right 
horse” because options that fail to win broad acceptance will have drawbacks 
later on. Although the dynamic here is related to the point about coordination 
effects above, it focuses on the self-fulfilling character of expectations. Pro­
jections about future aggregate use patterns lead individuals to adapt their 
behavior. These adaptations help to make those expectations come true.
It is a useful exercise at this stage to take a step back from the discussion of 
technology and recognize the broad applicability of the qualities just presented. 
Many social interactions have precisely these features. New social initiatives - 
such as the creation of organizations or institutions - usually entail consider­
able start-up costs; individuals, and organizations, learn by doing; we often 
have powerful incentives to coordinate our activities with those of other social 
actors; it is frequently important to bet on the right horse, and therefore we 
adapt our behavior in light of our expectations about the behavior of others. I 
wish to stress at the outset that the following discussion of technology is 
important primarily because it clarifies a set of relationships characteristic of 
many social interactions.
A number of economists have argued that the conditions which Arthur out­
lines have been relevant in the development of new technologies, especially 
those in complex, knowledge-intensive industries. Increasing returns/path 




























































































“QWERTY” typewriter keyboard, the triumph of the light-water nuclear reac­
tor in the United States, the battles between Betamax and VHS video recorders 
and DOS-based and Macintosh computers, early automobile designs, and com­
peting standards for electric current8.
While path dependence arguments about technology are probably the best 
known, economists have applied similar analyses in other contexts as well. In 
fact, the range of such applications is striking. Both Krugman (1991) and 
Arthur (1994 [1990]) have pointed to the role of path dependence in the spatial 
location of production. Given the importance of physical proximity in many 
aspects of economic life, agglomeration effects are widespread. Initial centers 
of economic activity may act like a magnet, influencing the locational decisions 
and investments of other economic actors. Established firms attract suppliers, 
skilled labor, specialized financial and legal services, and appropriate physical 
infrastructure, which makes the particular location attractive to other firms 
making similar products. So do social networks, which allow for easy 
exchange of information and expertise. Increasing returns arguments help 
explain the prevalence of pockets of specialized economic activity, from Sili­
con Valley to the high-end textile manufacturers of Northern Italy. Indeed, as 
Krugman has concluded, “[i]f there is one single area of economics in which 
path dependence is unmistakable, it is in economic geography - the location of 
production in space. The long shadow cast by history over location is apparent 
at all scales, from the smallest to the largest - from the cluster of costume 
jewelry firms in Providence to the concentration of 60 million people in the 
Northeast Corridor (Krugman 1991, p. 80).”9
These claims closely parallel a set of arguments about international trade. In 
fact, trade theory was one of the first places where arguments about increasing 
returns gained wide acceptance. Researchers began by focusing on economic 
trends which appeared anomalous from the perspective of traditional trade 
theory - ost notably, the explosion of intra-industry international trade after 
World War II (Krugman 1994). If comparative advantage results from
8 Many of these examples have been contested in turn by critics who deny the empirical 
claim that superior technologies lost out. Since these criticisms raise broader issues about 
the usefulness of path dependence arguments, I will postpone discussion until the end of 
this section.
9 Spatial concentration of production does not by itself demonstrate that one region was 
able to consolidate its position because of historical accident. Often geographic advan­
tages (location near crucial natural resources, or transportation networks like the Great 
Lakes) may play a key role. In many cases, both “natural” advantages and historical acci­




























































































“natural” features of different countries, one would expect most trade to occur 
between quite different countries - e.g., North-South trade of manufactured 
goods for raw materials. Most international trade, however, is North-North. 
Developed economies trade primarily with other developed countries, includ­
ing extensive exchanges within particular industries. This pattern suggests a 
puzzling result: broadly similar countries appear to have developed highly 
specialized “niche” comparative advantages.
Increasing returns provided an answer to this puzzle. Knowledge-intensive 
sectors will be prone to positive feedback. Countries which gain a lead in a 
particular field, for whatever reason, are likely to consolidate that lead over 
time. The result is a high degree of specialization. Even countries with quite 
similar initial endowments develop quite divergent areas of economic strength. 
Comparative advantage is not simply given, it is often created by a sequence of 
events over time.
It is worth noting that this research on trade has been used to derive some 
controversial policy implications. If first-mover advantages are significant, 
free trade may not be an optimal policy for a country competing with coun­
tries willing to subsidize emerging sectors. Under certain (restricted) condi­
tions, a policy of “picking winners” may make considerable economic sense 
(Krugman 1994; Tyson 199x). There remains considerable dispute about the 
significance of such opportunities for strategic intervention. Krugman, for 
instance, maintains that they will appear relatively infrequently - not so much 
because path dependence is rare, but because of the difficulty of a government 
identifying winners ex ante. Whatever the appropriate policy implications of 
path dependence in comparative advantage may be, however, its existence is 
now widely recognized in mainstream economics10.
Economists have also applied increasing returns arguments to economic 
change more broadly. The most prominent development in recent discussions 
of economic growth has centered on “endogenous growth” theory (Romer 
1986; Romer 1990). Economists in the 1980s became puzzled by the existence 
of growth rates (notably in developed countries during the post-World War II 
period) that seemed far greater than what measured increases in inputs of capi­
tal and labor could explain. Romer and others argued that increasing returns 
associated with economic applications of knowledge could help account for the
10 As Krugman (1996, pp. 110-11) notes, in the American Economic Association’s classifi­
cation system for journal articles one will now find “models of trade with increasing re­




























































































anomaly. Unlike capital and labor, many aspects of knowledge are non-rival - 
their use in one firm does not prevent their use in another. Thus, a single gain 
in knowledge can be applied in many settings, and can lead to dramatic 
improvements in productivity. Economic growth generates the kind of positive 
feedback that distinguishes increasing returns or path dependent processes.
A somewhat different analysis of growth based on increasing returns has 
emphasized the importance of complementarities (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; 
Milgrom, Quian and Roberts 1991). Various economic activities (e.g., in 
information technology) are often complementary to other related activities. 
Improvements in a core activity can thus spill over by improving related parts 
of the economy (lowering costs or increasing productivity). These improve­
ments in turn may increase the attractiveness of the core activity. From their 
formal analysis of such a dynamic, Milgrom, Guian and Roberts derive what 
they call the “momentum theorem”; “...once the system begins along a path of 
growth of the core variables, it will continue forever along that path or, more 
realistically, until unmodeled forces disturb the system” (Milgrom, Quian and 
Roberts, 1991, p. 85).
In short, economists are now applying path dependence and increasing 
returns arguments to a wide range of important economic phenomena, includ­
ing the emergence of new technologies and product innovation, patterns of 
trade, the spatial location of economic actors, and the sources of economic 
growth itself. Perhaps most important for students of politics, however, has 
been Douglass North’s application of path dependence arguments to issues of 
institutional emergence and change (North 1990a). North argues that all the 
features identified in investigations of increasing returns in technology can be 
applied to institutions as well. In contexts of complex social interdependence, 
new institutions will often entail high fixed or start-up costs, and involve con­
siderable learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations. 
Established institutions generate powerful inducements that reinforce their 
own stability and further development. “In short”, North concludes, “the 
interdependent web of an institutional matrix produces massive increasing 
returns” (North 1990a, p. 95).
This argument provides the core to North’s sweeping reinterpretation of 
economic history. The central puzzle motivating North’s inquiry is the limited 
convergence of economic performance across countries. Neo-classical theory 
suggests that it should be relatively easy for laggard countries to adopt the 




























































































gence. But we don’t. According to North, institutions, which he defines 
broadly to include “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, ... 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (p. 3), explain 
the anomaly of continued divergence in economic performance among coun­
tries over time. Once in place institutions are hard to change, and they have a 
tremendous impact on the possibilities for generating sustained economic 
growth. Individuals and organizations adapt to existing institutions. If the insti­
tutional matrix creates incentives for piracy, North observes, people will 
invest in becoming good pirates. Thus, where institutions fail to provide 
incentives to be economically productive, there is unlikely to be much eco­
nomic growth.
For political scientists, North’s insight is crucial for two reasons. First, he 
highlights the parallels between characteristics of technology and certain char­
acteristics of social interactions. In this context, it is worth noting that 
Arthur’s arguments about technology are not really about the technology itself 
but about the characteristics of a technology in interaction with certain quali­
ties of related social interactions. This is a promising line of thought which I 
will develop further in the next section. My view is that North has focused on 
only some of the appropriate parallels. There are other important ones.
That being said, the second reason North’s argument is so useful is because 
he rightly emphasizes that institutional development is subject to increasing 
returns. It is through their role in patterns of institutional emergence, persis­
tence, and change that path dependent social processes are most significant. 
Given the prominent role institutions have played in recent political science 
theorizing, the possible implications should be evident, but I will discuss them 
in more detail later in this essay.
Thus, the range of applications within economics is sweeping. The economic 
dialogue surrounding path dependence is the impassioned discourse of an 
emerging paradigm. Economists talk of “new” growth theory, “new” trade 
theory, and so on - all based on arguments involving increasing returns. Yet 
despite the prevalence of such arguments and the intellectual excitement asso­
ciated with them, there is good reason to believe that the range of application 
should be even wider in politics than it is in economics. To understand why, it 
is helpful to consider the major objections to path dependence arguments that 




























































































In a forceful critique, Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) have raised some 
tough questions about this new literature on increasing returns. They argue 
that there is little reason to believe that accidents matter much, or that eco­
nomic systems are very likely to get locked onto courses of sub-optimal per­
formance. Two aspects of their critique are relevant here11. First, they 
emphasize that only “remediable” path dependence is really of theoretical sig­
nificance. Second, they claim that market mechanisms insure that remediable 
path dependence is rare. I will take up each point in turn12.
Following Williamson (1993), Liebowitz and Margolis distinguish remedi­
able and non-remediable path dependence. They note two kinds of path depen­
dence (“first degree” and “second degree”) that are non-remediable, by which 
they mean that there are no feasible improvements in the path, either now or 
in the past. First degree path dependence “is a simple assertion of an intertem­
poral relationship, with no implied claim of inefficiency” (p. 207). Everyone 
accepts that current events depend on prior ones, in the minimal sense that 
these prior events create the stock (e.g, of factors of production) which cur­
rent actors must work with. It is not clear that the claim that “history matters” 
in this sense carries many powerful implications.
Second-degree path dependence “stipulates that intertemporal effects propa­
gate error” (ibid). With hindsight, we wish that some other alternative had 
been chosen. Yet Liebowitz and Margolis are also unconvinced of the implica­
tions of second degree path dependence. If we acted as best we could with the 
information available at the time, the mistake was unavoidable, and we cannot 
reasonably describe the outcome as inefficient.
Liebowitz and Margolis argue that the only kind of path dependence with 
major ramifications is path dependence that is potentially remediable: “third- 
degree path dependence, ... /which/ supposes the feasibility, in principle, of 
improvements in the path ... is the only form of path dependence that conflicts 
with the neoclassical model of relentlessly rational behavior leading to effi­
cient, and therefore predictable, outcomes” (ibid). This distinction between 
remediable and unremediable path dependence is crucial to their argument,
11 Liebowitz and Margolis also develop an empirical critique of an alleged case of path de­
pendence: VHS vs. Betamax. Elsewhere they have criticized other favored examples, 
such as the QWERTY keyboard (Liebowitz and Margolis 1990).
12 Note that the Margolis/Liebowtiz critique depends on both parts of their argument being 
true. The significance of path dependence for social scientists can be sustained if either 
the relevance of non-remediable path dependence or the prevalence of remediable path 




























































































because Margolis and Liebowitz believe that instances of the more theoreti­
cally troubling, remediable kind occur very infrequently.
Is their dismissal of non-remediable path dependence convincing? As 
Williamson notes, for policy purposes remediability is likely to be an appro­
priate standard. Recognizing the existence of path dependence may not help 
policymakers much if they do not know how to identify it ex ante13. But if our 
purpose is instead to understand - perhaps ex post - why societies move in 
particular directions and the consequences of such movements, this objection 
loses some of its force. Indeed, since it will often be impossible in principle to 
demonstrate that an alternative course of action would have been superior 
(either because the meaning of superiority itself is subject to dispute or 
because we cannot know what improvements in an alternative technology 
would have occurred if another path had been followed), the remediability test 
seems more like a debater’s point. By insisting on an impossible burden of 
proof, suggestions that the actual path chosen may have been problematic are 
simply ruled out of court by fiat.
The second part of the Margolis/Liebowitz analysis is the claim that remedi­
able path dependence is rare. Here, their argument is straightforward. If one 
of two options is superior in the long-run but not in the short-run, market 
arrangements will generally assure the adoption of the superior path. The 
ability of private actors to capture the returns from long-term investments 
prevents bad choices. Institutions of property rights, provisions for patents, 
etc. facilitate the internalization of possible externalities, and market arrange­
ments such as a plentiful supply of venture capital mean that options with low 
short-run pay-offs will nonetheless receive the support that they deserve. Eco­
nomic actors, in short, calculate in the shadow of the future, and are thus 
unlikely to indulge in myopic, short-term maximizing behavior at their own 
long-term expense.
This argument clearly has some force14. How much, however, depends on 
the strength of these mechanisms for over-coming short-term thinking or free­
riding. In my view, Margolis and Liebowitz are more than a little complacent 
about the capacity of such mechanisms to fully internalize the considerable 
externalities that are central to increasing returns arguments. I think it wise to
*3 As noted before, it is precisely for this reason that Krugman questions those making 
broad claims about the implications of increasing returns arguments for trade policy.
14 Indeed, Arthur explicidy recognized this possibility, although as far as I know he did not 




























































































leave this matter to economists, however15. Instead, what I would point out is 
that this effort to refute path dependence arguments in economics has very 
limited relevance for political scientists. However strong market mechanisms 
for “far-sightedness” may be, they are almost certainly far weaker in politics. 
I explain why in Section HI.
m . Moving From Economics to Politics:
The Applicability of Path Dependence Arguments
The application of economic methods to the study of politics has been 
unquestionably fruitful. In areas such as the study of party competition 
(Downs), the formation of interest groups and social movements (Olson) and 
voting and legislative behavior (Arrow), imports from economics have illumi­
nated important features of the political landscape. The value of economists’ 
academic exports is greatly enhanced, however, if the political science 
importers take careful account of the distinctive features of the “local” envi­
ronment (Moe 1990). Arguments drawn from economics must be sensitive to 
the quite different nature of the political world16.
This is as true for arguments about path dependence and increasing returns 
as it has proven to be for other kinds of analysis. Politics differs from eco­
nomics in many ways. The key is to identify those aspects of the political envi­
ronment which are most relevant to an investigation of the sources and conse­
quences of path dependence. I divide this discussion into two parts. First, I 
consider three prominent aspects of politics which are conducive to increasing
15 Except for one observation. The Liebowitz/Margolis critique focuses on choice of tech­
nologies or products. As noted earlier, this is but one of the many ways that increasing 
returns arguments are invading economics. How well could their argument be extended 
to other increasing returns processes? As I will make clear in the next section, it has little 
relevance to the development of institutions, which are also subject to increasing returns. 
In this regard it is revealing that the Liebowitz/Margolis essay does not even cite North’s 
work. As North has argued, path dependent processes of institutionalization are crucial to 
the development of particular market economies. Here far-sighted financial markets are 
generally of limited help. Thus the argument developed in Section III about path depen­
dent processes in politics is relevant for economists as well. Features of the polity - 
which may themselves be path dependent - determine whether the mechanisms upon 
which the Liebowitz/Margolis argument relies will in fact be present.
16 The following discussion is particularly indebted to Lindblom 1977, Moe 1984, Moe 




























































































returns processes: (1) the extremely high density of institutions; (2) the central 
role of collective action; and (3) the intrinsic complexity and opacity of poli­
tics. After briefly explicating each of these characteristics, I discuss their rele­
vance to the current discussion. All of these features make increasing returns 
processes more prevalent in politics. They increase the likelihood that multiple 
paths will be potentially viable.
In the second part of this discussion, I complement these claims by explain­
ing why the ameliorative mechanisms which Williamson and Margolis and 
Leibowitz identify in economic systems are less effective in correcting path 
dependence in politics. In particular, I emphasize three characteristics of poli­
tics; the weakness or absence of efficiency-enhancing mechanisms of competi­
tion and learning; the shorter time horizons of political actors, and the greater 
“stickiness” of political institutions. All of these features make increasing 
returns processes in politics more intense. They increase the difficulty of 
moving off a path once actors have started down it.
Thus having shown in Part II that increasing returns processes are now seen 
as central to economics, I wish to argue here that these dynamics will be both 
more prevalent and more intense in politics. I begin by discussing the reasons 
for expecting path dependence to occur more frequently, before turning to the 
reasons to expect it to place more powerful constraints on the course of politi­
cal development.
The Institutional Density of Politics. Many central features of political sys­
tems are compulsory rather than voluntary. Legally binding rules are not just 
a foundation for political activity (like property rights in the economy). They 
are instead the very essence of politics (Lindblom 1977; Moe 1990). Politics 
involves struggles over the power to establish, enforce, and change rules gov­
erning social action in a particular territory. Both formal institutions (such as 
constitutional arrangements) and public policies place extensive, legally-bind­
ing constraints on behavior.
Although unorthodox, the inclusion of public policies as well as formal 
institutions in this formulation is important (Pierson 1993). While policies are 
generally more easily altered than the constitutive rules of formal institutions, 
they are nevertheless extremely prominent constraining features of the politi­
cal environment. Policies, grounded in law and backed by the coercive power 
of the state, signal to actors what has to be done, what cannot be done, and 




























































































of these policies are also remarkably durable (Rose 1990). Especially in mod­
ern societies, extensive pre-existing policies fundamentally shape the incentives 
and resources of political actors.
Much of politics, in other words, is based on authority rather than 
exchange. Established constraints apply to all - those who do not approve as 
well as those who do - and they are backed up, ultimately, by force. Rhetorical 
flourishes aside, politics rests on coercion. Thus the “exit” option will often be 
unavailable (or prohibitively costly) to actors who feel poorly served by exist­
ing arrangements. Institutional constraints are ubiquitous in politics.
Such institutions, of course, are subject to massive increasing returns. 
North’s analysis, outlined in Part II, noted that institutions induce increasing 
returns processes that make reversals of course increasingly unattractive over 
time. In contexts of complex social interdependence, new institutions and 
policies will often generate high fixed costs, learning effects, coordination 
effects, and adaptive expectations. Institutions and policies may encourage 
individuals and organizations to develop specialized skills, make certain 
investments, purchase particular goods, or devote time and money to certain 
organizations. These activities increase the attractiveness of existing institu­
tional arrangements relative to hypothetical alternatives. In institutionally- 
dense environments, initial actions push individual behavior onto paths that are 
hard to reverse. As social actors make commitments based on existing institu­
tions and policies, the cost of exit from existing arrangements generally rises 
dramatically (Pierson 1996).
Now this is true of economic institutions as well as political ones, but insti­
tutional density is simply greater in politics than in economics. Sets of manda­
tory constraints are more central to what politics is about. Since institutions 
are prone to path dependence, the greater prevalence of institutions in politics 
means more path dependence in the political system as a whole.
The Collective Nature of Politics. Suppose you are working for a firm with 
an annoying boss and bad pay. You have a clear option: acting on your own, 
you can seek work elsewhere, either at one of a large number of other firms 
or by setting up business on your own. Your ability to move depends on the 




























































































limits on how annoying your boss can afford to be, and how bad the pay can 
get17.
Or suppose you invent a great new product. Assuming that you can get 
financial backing (which you should be able to do - remember, it is a great 
idea, and the market generates a ready supply of venture capitalists), your 
prospects are good. There is nothing stopping you from going in to business, 
or selling the idea to someone who will. Either way, the new, superior product 
gets to see the light of day, and you reap considerable benefits from your 
innovation.
The setting of consumers is similarly atomistic. In the textbook economics 
case, my decisions as a consumer are taken to be essentially independent of my 
expectations regarding the choices of other consumers18. There is no need for 
explicit attempts to coordinate behavior; the market simply aggregates the 
isolated decisions of individuals.
These highly stylized examples illustrate the flexibility, fluidity, and atom­
ization of economic markets. Political “markets” are different. They are far 
from being flexible and fluid. In politics, my actions are highly dependent 
upon the actions of others. What I get depends not just on what I do, but 
(mostly) on what others do. Following Olson’s path-breaking work, students 
of politics have long recognized the “logic of collective action.” Most of the 
“goods” produced in politics are public goods; it is difficult to limit their con­
sumption to those who helped provide them. As a result, individuals will have 
a strong tendency to free-ride. Coordinating the activity of many people - 
creating conditions favorable to collective action - is a principal issue in politi­
cal life.
There is another reason why political action frequently requires coordina­
tion. Many of the goals which political actors pursue have a “lumpy” or 
“winner-take-all” quality to them (politicians, coup plotters, and lobbyists 
either win or lose; legislation either passes or is rejected). Unlike economic
17 I am not trying to glorify the labor market here, but merely to point out a crucial differ­
ence between politics and economics in the nature of “exit” options.
18 Although this represents a critical difference between economics and politics, one would 
need to make a number of important qualifications. The decisions of other consumers 
clearly do affect the price, supply, and quality of the goods available to me. Furthermore, 
much economic activity, both on the production and consumption side, involves signifi­
cant externalities, which make the implications of consumption interdependent. For a 




























































































markets, where there is usually room for many firms, finishing second often 
does not count for much in politics. Indeed - the Menshiviks in 1917 come to 
mind - it can be extremely problematic. Here too, the effectiveness of my 
actions depends heavily on the actions of others. This is less true of some 
aspects of politics - such as answering an opinion poll question or voting - than 
others. Even in voting, however, the lumpiness of election outcomes means 
that if a person does not want to “waste” her vote, her actions may well turn 
on what she expects others to do.
Under these circumstances, actors must constantly adjust their behavior in 
the light of expectations of how others are likely to behave. Whether I put 
energy into developing a new party, or provide resources to an interest group, 
may depend to a considerable degree on my confidence that others will do the 
same. To take a more dramatic example, a protestor’s willingness to join a 
demonstration against an oppressive regime under the watchful eyes of the 
security police depends heavily on her confidence that she will be joined by 
many others (Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994). In short, problems of collective 
action abound in politics.
Collective action represents the second core feature of politics that is subject 
to massive increasing returns. Like institutional development, the dynamics of 
collective action are highly path dependent, since they involve many of the 
qualities conducive to increasing returns: high set-up or fixed costs, coordina­
tion effects, and a prominent role for adaptive expectations19. Thus, the kinds 
of incremental, micro-level adaptations that drive competitive adjustments 
towards efficient outcomes in the marketplace (e.g., consumers “voting with 
their dollars” by shifting from one product to another, or workers switching 
firms in search of higher wages) are likely to play a much less prominent role 
in politics.
Because individual adjustments in the absence of coordinated action are 
often ineffective in politics, change will be muted unless a “critical mass” can 
be generated. Creating such a critical massive generally requires some kind of 
coordination. Adaptive expectations are likely to be crucial. If this critical 
mass occurs, however, collective behavior is likely to exhibit increasing
19 Although “threshold” models ef collective action are now prevalent (see Granovetter 
1979; Chong 1991), I am not aware of anyone systematically applying the core elements 
of increasing returns arguments to collective action problems. Arguments in Mancur 
Olson’s The Rise and Decline o f Nations (Olson 1981), however, contain considerable 




























































































returns and major disruptions may take place (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
Collective action is therefore prone to unpredictability. Small events feedback 
into the possibilities for further activity. It is a process where history matters 
(Chong 1991).
The Complexity and Opacity of Politics. Economics is built in large part 
around the useful and plausible assumption that economic actors are good 
optimizers. Firms operate to maximize profits. The metric for good perfor­
mance is relatively simple and transparent. Various features of the economic 
environment can be analyzed in terms of how they contribute to or detract 
from firm performance. Observable, unambiguous, and often quantifiable 
indicators exist for many of these features. Workers can easily obtain fairly 
good information on the wages and working conditions on offer from differ­
ent firms. Consumers, too, are reasonably adept at navigating most aspects of 
the economic world. Prices send strong signals which facilitate comparisons. 
The quality of goods is generally evident in relatively short order, and 
repeated purchases allow consumers to sample alternatives and correct mis­
takes. Links between choices and outcomes are generally clear: I take a new 
job and my income rises; I buy a car and my checking account balance shrinks.
Of course, one could add many complications to this simple picture of the 
economic realm. My claim is not that economics is completely transparent. 
Rather, I wish to highlight that key features - specially the role of prices, the 
prevalence of repeated interactions, and the presence of relatively short causal 
chains between choices and results - make it relatively easy for economic 
actors to correct mistakes over time.
Politics is a far, far murkier environment. Politics lacks anything like the 
measuring rod of price, despite some reductionist efforts to make the search 
for votes the equivalent of the search for dollars. Political actors often pursue 
a range of goals. While politicians often will be focused on reelection, others 
(e.g., bureaucrats, interest groups) have different ambitions. Thus, it is diffi­
cult to say what an “effective” political system would look like - what it would 
optimize - even in theory.
It is even harder to actually identify observable aspects of political perfor­
mance, or, if we believe that a system is not performing well, to determine 
which elements in these highly complex systems are responsible and what 
adjustment would lead to better results. The complexity of the goals of poli­




























































































politics inherently ambiguous. As North has argued, “political markets are far 
more prone /than eco nomic markets/ to inefficiency- The reason is straight­
forward. It is extraordinarily difficult to measure what ,:s being exchanged in 
political markets and. in consequence to enforce agreements” (North 1990b, p. 
362).
It is important to note that North is not simply arguing that political deci­
sion-making is prone to greater inefficiency. It is not just, or even prima/ity- 
that politics deals with the same issues as economics but does so less efficiently 
because of the way that political decisions are made. Rather, politics gets stuck 
with the more difficult problems. Where transaction costs are low, market 
mechanisms are likely to be effective, but they tend to break down when trans­
action costs are very high. Thus, it is complex and ambiguous issues and 
problems that gravitate toward the public sphere.
Even if mistakes or failures in politics are apparent, improvement through 
“trial-and-error’ processes is difficult. Most participants in politics (voters, 
members of interest group) engage in activities only sporadically. Their tools 
of action are often crude, such as the blunt instrument of the vote, and their 
actions have consequences only when aggregated. There are often long lags 
and complex causal chains connecting these political actions to political out­
comes. The result is that mistaken understandings often do not get corrected.
Instead, as North (drawing on work in both cognitive psychology and 
organizational theory) has argued, actors operating in a social context of high 
complexity and opacity are heavily biased in the way they filter information 
into existing “mental maps” (North 1990; Denzau and North 1994). Confirm­
ing information tends to be incorporated, while disconfirming information is 
filtered out. Social interpretations of complex environments like politics are 
themselves subject to positive feedback. The development of basic social 
understandings involve high start-up costs and learning effects; they are fre­
quently shared with other social actors in ways which create network effects 
and adaptive expectations. Mental maps are subject to increasing returns.
North’s work here converges with long-standing views of those studying 
political culture as well as the recent contributions of cognitive science. Once 
established, basic outlooks on politics, ranging from ideologies to understand­
ings of particular aspects of governments or orientations towards political 





























































































There are, then, very strong reasons to believe tha t politics will be unusu­
ally prone to the increasing returns dynamics typical of path dependent pro­
cesses. Increasing Returns in fact characterize three of the most prominent 
features of political environments: processes of institutional development, pro­
cesses of collective action, and processes of social interpretation. This conclu­
sion should be underlined. By itself, it suggests wh> path dependence is a criti­
cal concept for those thinking about the sources of. political stability and 
change. If a recognition of the significance of increasing returns is shaking up 
economics, political scientists have an even greater need to consider its impli­
cations. Yet there is also reason to believe that path dependence effects in poli­
tics will often be particularly intense. In the remainder of this section I con­
sider why it will generally be more difficult to move off an existing path in 
politics than it would be in economics.
Economists have rarely worried about the possibilities of inefficient out­
comes, because they believe the market provides two powerful mechanisms for 
restoring efficiency: competition and learning. Competitive pressures in a 
market society mean that new organizations with more efficient structures will 
develop, eventually replacing suboptimal organizations (Alchian 1950). 
Learning processes within firms can also lead to correction. According to 
Williamson (1993), one can rely on the “far-sighted propensity” or “rational 
spirit” that economics ascribes to economic actors... Once the unanticipated 
consequences are understood, these effects will thereafter tie anticipated and 
the ramifications can be folded back into the organizational design. Unwanted 
costs will then be mitigated and unanticipated benefits will t e  enhanced. Better 
economic performance will ordinarily result, (pp. 116-17)
It is worth emphasizing that neither of these mechanism?, represents a com­
pelling protection in the increasing returns contexts explored by Arthur, 
North and others, because inferior options possessing initial advantages will 
often reinforce themselves over time. Moreover, both these corrective mech­
anisms are even less applicable when one shifts from Williamson’s focus on 
firms in private markets to the world of political institutions (Moe 1984, 
1990). This is clearest for mechanisms of competition. Political institutions 
rarely confront a dense environment of competing institutions that will 
instantly capitalize on inefficient performance, swooping in to carry off an 
institution’s “customers” and drive it into bankruptcy. While models of com­
petition may be helpful for understanding some important aspects of politics 




























































































ronments are typically more permissive than economic ones (Krasner 1989; 
Powell and DiMaggio 1991).
The complexity and ambiguity of politics also creates problems for learning 
arguments. It may be appropriate in some circumstances to argue that politics 
involves learning processes, in which responses to public problems proceed in 
a trial-and-error fashion (Heclo 1974; Hall 1993). There is little reason, how­
ever, to think that this acts as a selection mechanism with anything like the [| 
efficiency-enhancing properties of market competition in economics or 
Darwinian natural selection in biology. As already noted, because political 
reality is so complex and the tasks of evaluating public performance and 
determining which options would be superior are so formidable, such self­
correction will often be limited. The development of what North calls our 
“subjective models” of the political world is itself path dependent - we tend to 
feed back in information that confirms pre-existing views, rather than correct­
ing them (North 1990b).
There is an additional problem in politics. Even where learning does occur, 
it must still be “folded back into the organizational design.” Here, all the bar­
riers to change in systems subject to increasing returns become relevant: long 
movement down a particular path will have increased its desirability relative 
to possible alternatives. Furthermore, in politics the pursuit of such change 
faces two additional obstacles: the short time-horizons of political actors and 
the strong status quo bias (i.e., stickiness) associated with the decision rules 
governing most political institutions. These factors will often make lock-in 
effects particularly intense in polities.
Time Horizons A statement attributed to David Stockman, budget director 
during the Reagan administration, is unusual among political decision makers 
only for its candor. Asked by an adviser to consider pension reforms to com­
bat Social Security’s severe long-term financing problems, Stockman dismissed 
the idea out of hand, exclaiming that he had no interest in wasting “a lot of 
political capital on some other guy’s problem in [the year] 2010" (quoted in 
Greider 1982, p. 43).
Many of the implications of political decisions - especially complex policy 
interventions or major institutional reforms - only play out in the long run. 
Yet political actors, especially politicians, are often most interested in the 
short-term consequences of their actions; long-term effects are often heavily 




























































































noted that in the long run, we are all dead; for politicians in democratic poli­
ties, electoral death can come much faster. Because the decisions of voters, 
which determine political success, are taken in the short-run, elected officials 
employ a high discount rate. They have a strong incentive to pay attention to 
long-term consequences only if these become politically salient, or when they 
have little reason to fear short-term electoral retribution.
The absence of serious attention to this issue of discount rates, or time hori­
zons, in politics is striking. An interesting literature is developing on “credible 
commitments” - the attempt of political actors to create arrangements that 
facilitate cooperation by lengthening time horizons. Yet we know relatively 
little about the time horizons of different political actors, or about the institu­
tional arrangements that are conducive to lowering their discount rates (i.e., 
increasing the political relevance of the future)20. Recent research suggests 
that particular institutional designs (such as independent central banks), 
empowering particular kinds of political actors (e.g., bankers) may succeed in 
lengthening time horizons in politics.
In general, however, there is reason to expect that such mechanisms will be 
less effective in politics than in economics. As noted in Part II, the market­
place possesses strong mechanisms for lengthening time horizons - especially 
the basic continuity of firms over time and the presence of capital markets. 
Such mechanisms in politics are generally far weaker. It is difficult to monitor 
political behavior over time because indicators of performance are frequently 
so limited. Thus it is no accident that much of the typically optimistic rational 
choice discussion of “credible commitments” in politics has focussed on 
relatively transparent financial issues (e.g ., budget deficits, monetary policy). 
In these instances, performance indicators are clear and behavior easy to 
monitor. While these issues are clearly important, it must be stressed that for 
reasons already noted they are fundamentally atypical of the kinds of matters 
dealt with in politics. Not only is monitoring often exceptionally difficult in 
politics, but it is also hard to hold actors accountable, because of the relatively 
rapid turnover of key positions (see below). Politics, jin short, lacks the 
characteristic property rights that facilitate the linkage of actors’ decisions 
over time in the economic sphere. In many cases, the long term is essentially 
beyond the political horizon. A statesman, Bismarck said, is a politician who 
thinks about his grandchildre n.
20 For an introduction to the literature on credible commitment see North and Weingast 




























































































The different natures of time horizons in politics and in economics matters 
a lot. This can be seen by revisiting the critique of path dependence presented 
in Section II. Liebowitz and Margolis properly point to the mechanisms of 
financial markets as a protection against “Type III” path dependence. If it is 
known that long-term benefits, applying a market discount rate and allowing 
for uncertainty, will be greater using option B, then investors should gravitate 
toward that option even if in the short-term it will perform more poorly than 
option A. Thus, they argue that market mechanisms should allow the more 
efficient outcome (B) in Figure 1.
In politics, however, the outcome may well be different. Assume that the 
crucial decision-maker is a politician up for re-election in two years. In this 
context, effects after the election cycle do not count for much21. A politician 
focusing on the short term pay-off would choose Option A. This is not a small 
point. If political decision-makers face many decisions like those outlined in 
Figure 1, and if their time-horizons tend to be short, we can expect move­
ments onto less-than-optimal paths to be common. Crucially, we can also 
expect that once on such a path political actors will generally have little incen­
tive to jump off of it. The costs of doing so are borne in the short-run, while 
the benefits will generally only accrue in the long run - hat is, to someone else.
Institutional “Stickiness” in Politics. Political arrangements are unusually 
hard to change. An individual with a new idea for a product need only secure 
the finance to put it on the market. If enough consumers (choosing indepen­
dently) find it sufficiently appealing, the product will be a success. Change can 
be engineered through competitive success against existing products. Similarly, 
those with property rights over a firm are generally in a strong position to 
remake their organizations as they choose. Lines of authority are clear, and 
the relevant decision makers are likely to share the same broad goal of maxi­
mizing profits.
By contrast, key features of political life, both public policies and 
(especially) formal institutions are change-resistant. Policies and institutions 
are in fact designed to be difficult to overturn. There are two broad reasons 
why. First, those who design institutions and policies may wish to bind their
2 1 These long-term effects will count if an actor with longer time-horizons (such as an inter­
est group) is able to make them relevant to politicians - e.g., through campaign contribu­
tions or votes. The question is whether such mechanisms are anywhere near as effective 
as the capital markets operative in the economic sphere. In my view, there are strong rea­




























































































successors. Moe terms this the problem of “political uncertainty.” Unlike eco­
nomic actors, political actors must anticipate that their political rivals may 
soon control the reins of government. To protect themselves, these actors 
therefore create rules that make pre-existing arrangements hard to reverse. As 
Moe (1990, p. 125) puts it, designers do not want ‘their’ agencies to fall under 
the control of opponents. And given the way public authority is allocated and 
exercised in a democracy, they often can only shut out their opponents by 
shutting themselves out too. In many cases, then, they purposely create struc­
tures that even they cannot control.
Polidcal actors do not only wish to bind their successors, however. In many 
cases, they are also compelled to bind themselves. The key insight of the 
“credible commitments” literature is that actors can often do better if they can 
succeed in removing certain altemadves from their future menu of opuons. 
The economy of a country will grow faster, for instance, if a monarch can 
credibly commit himself to refrain from expropriaung an excessive amount of 
the hard-earned wealth of his subjects (North and Weingast 1989). This can be 
done if he accedes to Parliamentary control over the power to tax. Stickiness is 
built into the design of political institutions to reduce uncertainty and enhance 
stability, facilitating forms of cooperation and exchange which would other­
wise be impossible. Like Ulysses preparing for the Sirens, political actors 
often bind themselves, restricting their own freedom to serve some greater 
goal. To constrain themselves and others, designers create institutions that are 
sticky. Often, the barriers to reform are extremely high: e.g., unanimity 
requirements in the European Union, multiple supermajorities to alter the 
American constitution.
The relevant point for the current discussion is that this institutional sticki­
ness characteristic of political systems reinforces the already considerable 
obstacles to movement off of an established path. Combined with the lack of 
competitive mechanisms, the weakness of learning processes, and the short 
time horizons characteristic of politics, it suggests that path dependent tenden­
cies in political development are likely to be particularly intense. Both the 
prevalence and intensity of increasing returns processes in politics support the 
broad claim that path dependence arguments are particularly important for 
understanding political dynamics.
To end this section and make the discussion somewhat more concrete, let me 




























































































This case provides a good illustration of path dependence effects22. Discontent 
with the inefficiencies of the American health care system increased signifi­
cantly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. By a number of basic criteria, the 
American health care system possessed clear shortcomings (White 1995). Costs 
were extremely high by international standards and were rising quickly. The 
number of Americans without insurance - a phenomenon essentially unknown 
in other developed economies - was also high and growing rapidly. In 
response to these challenges, the Clinton administration expended a great deal 
of political capital during its first two years on efforts to move towards 
national health insurance. Despite high initial aspirations, the administration 
eventually suffered a crushing defeat.
Three factors contributed to this outcome, each of which underscores the 
significance of the processes discussed in this essay. First, the task of convinc­
ing voters to reorient their thinking to support a major expansion of govern­
ment’s role in the health care sector was a very difficult one. Although voters 
in other countries, which have experience with national health insurance, see it 
as a effective vehicle for assuring access and cost containment, basic under­
standings of how health care systems can function are quite different in the 
United States. Given the complexity of health care and deep political cleavages 
over the role of government in the United States, there was tremendous dis­
agreement about the appropriate policy response. Mobilization of potential 
supporters was therefore difficult.
A second factor was the massive array of interest groups which had grad­
ually grown up around the existing public-private mix of health care provision 
- a classic illustration of the increasing returns effects associated with pre­
existing public policies and the patterns of collective action they help to 
induce. Health care was on the verge of becoming a trillion dollar industry, 
and those who benefited from these arrangements devoted enormous resources 
to preserving the status quo.
The final factor was the stickiness of formal institutions, which increased 
the obstacles to reform. The Madisonian structure of the federal government 
created multiple veto points and supermajority requirements (60 votes in the 
Senate), which facilitated the efforts of health care opponents to first delay
22 On the origins and fate of the Clinton initiatives see Hacker 1996 and Skocpol 1996. The 




























































































reform, then erode popular support, and finally prevent efforts to bring a 
compromise bill to a vote in the fall of 1994 (Steinmo and Watts 1995).
Conservative critics would argue that the Clinton plan was undermined by 
its own unpopularity and strong anti-government sentiment, but the events 
following the election of 1994 illustrate similar constraints on an anti-govern­
ment initiative in health care. Following their historic victory, Congressional 
Republicans launched a sweeping proposal to cut and reform Medicare and 
Medicaid as part of their push to balance the budget and finance an extensive 
array of tax cuts. Again, tremendous amounts of political capital were 
expended to generate collective action in favor of radical reform. Had these 
proposals succeeded, they would have considerably diminished the role of the 
federal government in health care. Yet the Republican proposals ran into the 
same two problems that had hindered the Clinton administration’s effort to 
move health care policy onto a different path. Political interests which had 
grown up around the status quo (this time, those who benefited from Medicare 
and Medicaid) rallied in support, and sticky institutions (in this case, the Presi­
dential veto) blocked the momentum of reform advocates. Thus even when an 
area of public policy is widely seen as problematic, it may be extremely diffi­
cult to engineer serious reforms if the policy has become deeply institutional­
ized.
Politics differs from economics in many ways. Applying tools of economic 
analysis to politics is treacherous, unless these differences are systematically 
taken into account. In the case of arguments about path dependence, attention 
to the character of politics suggests a striking result. The political world is 
unusually prone to increasing returns.
IV. Path Dependence and the Study of Politics
Let me briefly summarize the discussion so far. Where increasing returns 
processes are at work, the following are also likely to be true:
(1) Multiple Equilibria. Under a set of initial conditions conducive to path 





























































































(2) Contingency. Relatively small events, if occurring at the right moment, 
can have large and enduring consequences. Accidents can happen.
(3) Timing and sequencing become crucial. In path dependent processes, 
when an event occurs may be just as important as what occurs. Because early 
parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens 
“too late” may have no impact, though it might have been of great consequence 
if the timing had been different.
(4) Punctuated Equilibria. Path dependence arguments generally imply that 
rather than exhibiting gradualism, the phenomenon under investigation may be 
subject to long periods of relative stability followed by brief bursts of rapid 
change. These brief bursts are often associated with exogenous shocks and 
tipping points. Pressures may be dormant for long periods until they build up 
to the point where increasing returns set in, the pace of change accelerates, and 
movement to widely different outcomes becomes possible.
Thus far I have emphasized two points: that there has been an explosion of 
interest in path dependence among economists, and that there are good reasons 
to think that path dependent processes are far more prevalent in politics. What 
are the implications for political scientists? What can an appreciation of path 
dependence contribute to our understanding of politics, and, equally impor­
tant, what can’t such an appreciation do? These are the issues which I take up, 
admittedly in a very preliminary way, in this final section.
One virtue of path dependence arguments is that they provide a very impor­
tant corrective to functionalist tendencies in political science. Although not 
always explicitly stated, functionalist arguments are prevalent among political 
scientists. They are common, for instance, among those who emphasize the 
rational choices of individual actors that underlie political activity, and the 
reasonably efficient nature of collective responses to social needs (Keohane 
1984; Shepsle 1986; Weingast and Marshall 1988).
Functionalist arguments take the following form: outcome X (an institution, 
for instance) exists because it serves the function Y. In a world of purposive 
actors, it may indeed be the case that the effects of an institution have some­
thing to do with an explanation for its emergence and persistence. Arguments 
about path dependence, however, suggest the large dangers in any assumption 
that an existing institution arose or continued to exist because it serves some 




























































































institution, policy, or social organization may be a good way to derive causal 
hypotheses, but functional accounts are far from being the only plausible ones. 
Many alternatives might have been possible, and a dynamic of increasing 
returns may have locked in a particular option even though it originated by 
accident, or the factors that gave it an original advantage have long since 
passed away. Rather than assuming relative efficiency as an explanation, we 
have to go back and look.
Thus an awareness of the possibility of path dependence necessarily draws 
social scientists to an investigation of history, if only to evaluate the validity of 
functionalist assertions. Yet this is merely a prelude. More broadly, path 
dependence arguments can help political scientists to think more clearly and 
explicitly about the role of time, and history, in social analysis.
At one level, all social scientists agree that “history matters.” The existing 
conditions which influence current social outcomes came into being in some 
way. Those earlier processes are thus relevant to a full understanding of con­
temporary social events. Yet the standard argument is that for most purposes 
we may safely put such issues aside. Looking back leads to the familiar prob­
lem of infinite regress, with an exploration of each preceding event leading to 
the conclusion that some other preceding occurrence was also part of the chain 
of events, and so on. Social scientists, by this line of thought, need to break 
through the seamlessness of history somewhere, and the present is as good a 
place as any to do so. George Homans (1967) compared the situation of social 
scientists to that faced by mine-sweepers who needed to know the magnetic 
charge of a ship. Such a charge resulted from an infinite range of small factors 
accumulated over the ship’s lifetime, but for practical purposes a simple 
expedient could be used: the current charge of the ship could be measured. If 
the task is to understand the ship’s vulnerability, one can simply cut through 
the Gordian knot of historical regress23.
This is a strong argument, and for many purposes, an appropriate one. In 
practice, social scientists will often have good reason to focus on synchronic 
causality - to try to understand how variations in current variables affect pre­
sent social outcomes. Path dependence arguments, however, suggest that there 
will often be a number of problems with such a strategy.




























































































Path dependence arguments rest on a conception of “historical causes” 
(Stinchcombe 1968, pp. 103-18; Ikenberry 1994), where some original order­
ing moment caused current patterns, and the activity is continuously repro­
duced even though the original event no longer occurs. While under conditions 
of path dependence it is true that current circumstances in some sense “cause” 
current outcomes, a focus on these simultaneous occurrences is highly mislead­
ing. It provides a “snapshot” explanation for what should be seen as a moving 
picture. In path dependent processes, the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for current outcomes may have occurred in the past. Reproduction of the cur­
rent path is now commonplace, perhaps basically invisible or at least analyti­
cally uninteresting. The crucial object of study, the critical juncture, lies in a 
preceding set of events which set development along a particular path.
Path dependence arguments also direct attention to the role of timing and 
sequence in politics. Under conditions of path dependence, the same event 
(e.g., an exogenous shock such as recession or war) will often have a radically 
different impact depending on when in a sequence of events it occurs. In a 
masterful analysis, Ruth Collier and David Collier (1991) have shown how the 
timing of exogenous shocks in relation to domestic sequences of political 
events was crucial in determining divergent patterns of labor incorporation 
across Latin America. Steven Skowronek (1993) has persuasively argued that 
we cannot understand the opportunities, constraints and demands that a presi­
dent faces without placing him within a sequence of presidencies that support 
or oppose the governing coalition of a particular period.
Indeed, the central properties of increasing returns argument provide con­
siderable support for many of the key claims of historical institutionalist anal­
yses in political science. Although much of this work has been essentially 
inductive in orientation, it has stressed the need to study temporal processes in 
order to explain critical political outcomes. Historical institutionalism has 
focused precisely on identifying critical moments in politics, distinctive devel­
opmental sequences, and the rigidities that make it difficult for social actors to 
escape from established paths24.
Of course, recent works of historical institutionalism build on a healthy 
tradition of attention to history in the social sciences. Particularly for those 
pressing to answer critical questions about the experiences of real polities, the





























































































turn to history has been common. Issues of timing, sequence, and critical 
junctures figure prominently in this research. Moore’s work on transitions to 
democracy (Moore 1966) and Lipset and Rokkan’s analysis of the formation of 
party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) are two classic examples, but many 
others could be mentioned. Indeed, it is fair to ask whether the current inves­
tigation offers anything new - whether incorporating path dependence into the 
study of politics is akin to the man who discovered that he had been speaking 
prose all is life. Is path dependence merely a trendy name for old ideas?
Discussions of path dependence would be worth having if they did no more 
than focus the attention of fad-prone political scientists on the insights and 
continuing relevance of this earlier body of work. Yet there is every reason to 
believe that the concept can do more. First, understanding the dynamics of 
increasing returns processes can greatly sharpen our understanding of why 
particular junctures (and which aspects of those junctures) are critical and why 
timing often matters so much. While it would take a detailed literature review 
to document this claim, most of the work just mentioned has been rather vague 
on this point. The specific characteristics of positive feedback provide the key 
to making sense of the complex mix of stability and bursts of rapid change 
which characterize so many political processes. In an oft-abused but still useful 
phrase, attention to the character of increasing returns can help provide the 
micro-foundations which lay bare how the actions of individuals aggregate to 
produce fundamental, macro-level outcomes.
Second, an investigation of the sources of increasing returns processes pro­
vides a basis for developing important hypotheses about political stability and 
change. To repeat, Arthur’s work on increasing returns is ground-breaking 
not simply because he described the characteristics of these processes, but 
because he has begun to identify the conditions which are conducive to path 
dependence. The major ambition of this essay, building on North’s work, has 
been to begin the process of adapting these arguments to the study of politics. 
Doing so has required careful attention to the distinctive features of the politi­
cal world - its intrinsic ambiguity, the prevalence of highly sticky institutions, 
the prominence of collective action problems, and the pervasiveness of short 
time-horizons. Not all aspects of political life are subject to increasing returns. 
Furthermore, this paper has highlighted more specific features of political 
environments (e.g., those that affect the time horizons of key political actors) 
which are likely to influence the initiation and reinforcement of increasing 




























































































sitions about the conditions that facilitate or impede various types of political 
change.
An understanding of increasing returns processes can make one final con­
tribution to political scientists: a healthy dose of humility. Since the rise of 
behaviorism, many political scientists have had lofty aspirations about develop­
ing a science of politics, rooted in parsimony and generalization, and capable 
of great predictive power. Despite modest achievements over a period of four 
decades, these aspirations remain. Setbacks are shrugged off with calls for 
more time or more sustained application of the proper methods. Yet the 
inability of political scientists to generate powerful generalizations that facili­
tate prediction remains a puzzle. If the prevalence of increasing returns pro­
cesses is indeed a distinctive feature of politics, however, then we have been 
looking in the wrong place for an explanation. The problem lies not in our 
































































































Alchian Armen A. (1950). “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory”, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 58, 1950, pp. 211-21
Arthur, W. Brian. 1994. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the 
Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press)
Baumgartner, Frank, and Brian Jones (1993). Agendas, Instability, and 
American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
Chong, Dennis (1991). Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
Collier, Ruth Berins and Collier, David (1991). Shaping the Political Arena: 
Critical Junctures, The Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
David, Paul (1985). “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”, American Eco­
nomic Review, Vol. 75, pp. 332-37
Denzau, Arthur D. and Douglass C. North (1994). “Shared Mental Models: 
Ideologies and Institutions”, Kyklos, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 3-31
Fearon, James D. (1996). “Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: 
Exploring an Analogy between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes”, 
in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds, Counterfactual Thought Experi­
ments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspec­
tives (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 39-67
Greider, William (1982). The Education of David Stockman and Other 
Americans (New York: Dutton)
Hacker, Jacob S. (1996). “National Health Care Reform: An Idea Whose Time 





























































































Hall, Peter (1993). “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The 
Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain”, Comparative Politics, April, pp. 
275-96
Heclo, Hugh (1974). Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New 
Haven: Yale University Press)
Hirsch, Fred (1977). The Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­
versity Press)
Homans, George (1967). The Nature of the Social Sciences (New York)
Ikenberry, John (1994). “History’s Heavy Hand: Institutions and the Politics of 
the State”. Unpublished manuscript
Kaldor, Nicholas (1972). “The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics”, The 
Economic Journal, 82, No. 328, pp. 1237-55
Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
Knapp, Peter (1983) “Can Social Theory Escape from History?” History and 
Theory, Vol. 23, 1983, pp. 34-52
Krasner, Stephen (1989). “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective”. In James 
A. Caporaso, ed., The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspec­
tives (Newbury Par, CA: Sage)
Krugman, Paul (1991). “History and Industry Location: The Case of the Man­
ufacturing Belt”, American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 80-83
Krugman, Paul (1996). Pop Internationalism (Cambridge: MIT Press)
Kuran, Timur (1989). “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated 
Revolution”, Public Choice, pp
Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen E. Margolis (1990). “The Fable of the Keys”, 




























































































Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen E. Margolis (1995). Path Dependence, Lock-In, 
and History. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
pp. 205-226
Lindblom, Charles E. (1977). Politics and Markets. (New York: Basic Books)
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967). “Cleavage, Structure, Party 
Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction”, in Lipset and Rokkan, eds.. 
Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press)
Lohmann, Susanne (1994). “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The 
Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991”. World Poli­
tics, Vol. 47, pp. 42-101
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990). “The Economics of Modem Manu­
facturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization”. American Economic 
Review, Vol. 80, pp. 511-28
Milgrom, Paul, Yingi Qian and John Roberts (1991). “Complementarities, 
Momentum, and the Evolution of Modem Manufacturing”. American Eco­
nomic Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 84-88
Moe, Terry (1984). “The New Economics of Organization”. American Journal 
of Political Science, Vol. 28, pp. 739-77
Moe, Terry (1990). “The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of 
Public Bureaucracy”. In O. E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory: From 
Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), pp. 116-53
Moore Jr., Barrington (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 
(Boston: Beacon Press)
Myrdal, Gunnar (1978). “Institutional Economics”, Journal of Economic 
Issues, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 771-83
North, Douglass C. (1990a). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
North, Douglass C. (1990b). “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics”. Journal 




























































































North, Douglass C. (1993). “Institutions and Credible Commitment”. Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 No. 1, pp. 11-23
North, Douglass C. and Weingast, Barry R. (1989). “Constitutions and 
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth Century England”. Journal of Economic History, 49, pp. 803-32
Olson, Mancur (1981). The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale 
University Press)
Pierson, Paul (1993). “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and 
Political Change”. World Politics, 45, pp. 595-628
Pierson, Paul (1996). “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institu­
tionalist Analysis”. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 123-63
Romer, Paul M. (1986). “Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth”, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 94, pp. 1002-37
Romer, Paul M. (1990). “Are Nonconvexities Important for Understanding 
Growth?” American Economic Review, Vol. 80, pp. 97-103
Rose, Richard, “Inheritance Before Choice in Public Policy”, Journal of Theo­
retical Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 263-91
Schelljng, Thomas (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: 
Norton)
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1986). “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Insti­
tutions’', in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed., Political Science: The Science of Politics 
(New York: Agathon Press)
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1991). “Discretion, Institutions and the Problem of Gov­
ernment Commitment”. In Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman (eds.), Social 
Theory for a Changing Society. Boulder: Westview Press
Skocpol, Theda (1992). Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins 




























































































Skocpol, Theda (1996). Boomerang: Clinton’s Health Security Effort and the 
Turn against Government (New York: Norton)
Skowronek, Stephen (1993). The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from 
John Adams to George Bush (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard)
Spruyt, Hendrik (1994). The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press)
Thelen, Kathleen and Steinmo, Sven, “Historical Institutionalism in Compara­
tive Politics”, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., 
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Veblen, Thorstein B. (1898). “Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Sci­
ence?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 373-97
Weingast, B. R. And W. J. Marshall (1988), “The Industrial Organization of 
Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are not Organized as Markets”, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, pp. 132-63
Weir, Margaret, ed. (1997). New Democrats and Anti-Federalists: Social Poli­
cymaking in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution)
White, Joseph (1996). Competing Solutions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution Press)
Williamson, Oliver E. (1993). “Transaction Cost Economics and Organization 




























































































PAUL PIERSON (Center for European Studies, Harvard University - 27 
Kirkland Street - Cambridge, MA 02138 - pierson@fas.harvard.edu). Political 
Scientist is Professor of Government at Harvard University, teaching courses 
in comparative public policy and political economy. He is the author of Dis­
mantling the Welfare State? The Politics of Retrenchment in Britain and the 
United States (Cambridge University Press, 1994), and co-editor of European 
Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (Brookings Institution, 
1995). His articles have appeared in such journals as Comparative Political 
Studies', Governance', Politics and Society-, Studies in American Political De­
velopment', and World Politics, as well as numerous edited volumes. He is cur­
rently working on a study of comparative business influence, focusing on the 





















































































































































































Jean Monnet Chair Papere
European University Institute, Florence
1. CHRISTOPH BERTRAM/Sir 
JULIAN BULLARD/
LORD COCKFIELD/ Sir DAVID
H a n n a y /M ic h a el  p a l m e r  
Power and Plenty? From the 
Internal Market to Political and 
Security Cooperation in Europe, 
April 1991, pp. 73
2. Ro b e r t  G ilpin
The Transformation of the 
International Political Economy, 
April 1991, pp.27
3. EDMOND MALINVAUD 
Macroeconomic Research and 
European Policy Formation, 
April 1991, pp. 58
4. S er g io  R o m a n o
Soviet Policy and Europe Since 
Gorbachev,
April 1991, pp. 25
5. B e r n t v o n  Sta d en  
The Politics of European 
Integration,
April 1991, pp. 33
6. HELGA h a f t e n d o r n  
European Security Cooperation 
and the Atlantic Alliance,




Europe and the East Asian 
Agenda,
October 1991, pp. 87
8. Ro g er  G. N o ll
The Economics and Politics of 
Deregulation,
October 1991, pp. 89
9. ROBERT TRIFFIN
IMS International Monetary 
System - or Scandal?,
March 1992, pp. 49
10. EGON BAHR
From Western Europe to Europe, 
June 1992, pp. 42
11. HELGE HVEEM
The European Economic Area 
and the Nordic Countries - End 
Station or Transition to EC 
Membership?,
June 1992, pp. 21
12. E ric  s tein  
Post-communist Constitution­
making: Confessions of a 
Comparatist (Part I),
August 1992, pp. 63
13. Ca r o l e  F in k  
1922/23 From Illusion to 
Disillusion,
October 1992, pp. 19
14. LOUIS H. ORZACK 
International Authority and 
Professions. The State Beyond 
The Nation-State,



























































































15. Vla d im ir  M. K o l l o n t a i 
Economic Reform in Russia, 
November 1992, pp. 43
16. RYUTARO KOMIYA 
Japan’s Comparative Advantage 
in the Machinery Industry: 
Industrial Organization and 
Technological Progress,
October 1993, pp. 60
17. G iu l ia n o  A m a to  
Problems of Governance - Italy 
and Europe: A Personal 
Perspective,
October 1994, pp. 39
18. Je r em y  R ic h a r d so n  
The Market for Political 
Activism: Interest Groups as a 
Challenge to Political Parties, 
November 1994, pp. 37
19. Ric h a r d  B. St e w a r t  
Markets versus Environment?, 
January 1995, pp. 53
20. Jo h n  G e r a r d  r u g g ie  
At Home Abroad, Abroad at 
Home: International Liberaliza­
tion and Domestic Stability in the 
New World Economy,
February 1995, pp. 64
21. DAVID VOGEL
The Relationship Between Envi­
ronmental and Consumer Regu­
lation and International Trade, 
February 1995, pp. 44
22. Jo h n  W ill ia m so n  
Proto-EMU as an Alternative to 
Maastricht,
March 1995, pp. 20
23. T h o m a s  C. Heller  
Joint Implementation and the 
Path to a Climate Change 
Regime,
March 1995, pp. 49
24. No r m a n  Sc h o f ie l d  
Modelling Political Order in 
Representative Democracies,
June 1995, pp. 38
25. VOJIN DIMITRUEVIC 
The Fate of Non-Members of 
Dominant Nations in Post- 
Communist European Countries, 
June 1995, pp. 34
26. Ho r s t  S ie b er t  
Eastern Germany in the Fifth 
Year. Investment Hammering in 
the Basement?,
September 1995, pp. 45
27. CAROL HARLOW 
Codification of EC 
Administrative Procedures? 
Fitting the Foot to the Shoe or the 
Shoe to the Foot,
September 1995, pp. 34
28. FRITZ W. SCHARPF 
Negative and Positive Integration 
in the Political Economy of 
European Welfare States, 
November 1995, pp. 44
29. VINCENT WRIGHT 
Industrial and Banking 
Privatization in Western Europe: 
Some Public Policy Paradoxes, 



























































































30. Ro b e r t  O. Ke o h a n e  
Local Commons and Global 
Environmental Interdependence: 
Tragedy of the Commons or 
Opportunity for Institutions?, 
November 1995, pp. 21
31. SABINO CASSESE 
The Difficult Profession of 
Minister of Public 
Administration,
December 1995, pp. 31
32. m a n c u r  O l so n  j r .
The Varieties of Eurosclerosis: 
The Rise and Decline of Nations 
since 1982,
December 1995, pp. 37
33. Rod  A.W. Rh o d es  
Towards a Postmodern Public 
Administration: Epoch, 
Epistemology or Narrative?, 
December 1995, pp. 49
34. MARTIN SHAPIRO 
Independent Agencies:
US and EU,
April 1996, pp. 31
35. SASKIA SASSEN
The De-Facto Transnationalizing 
of Immigration Policy,
April 1996, pp. 36
36. JOSÉ MARIA MARAVALL 
The Outcomes of Democracy, 
April 1996, pp. 53
37. P ier r e  R o s a n v a l l o n  
État-providence et citoyenneté 
sociale,
September 1996, pp. 27
38. PETER B. KENEN 
Sorting Out Some EMU Issues, 
October 1996, pp. 36
39. En hommage à ÉMILE NOËL, 
December 1996, pp. 21
40. TOMMASO PADOA- 
SCHIOPPA
The Genesis of EMU: A 
Retrospective View,
December 1996, pp. 21
41. G il  C a r l o s  Ro d r ig u e z  
Ig l e s ia s
Le pouvoir judiciaire de la 
Communauté européenne au 
stade actuel de l’évolution de 
l’Union,
December 1996, pp. 27
42. WOLFGANG STREECK 
Citizenship under Regime 
Competition: The Case of the 
“European Works Councils”, 
April 1997, pp 49
43. NICOLE QUESTIAUX
Le Conseil d’État français et la 
norme communautaire: 
l’hybridation en tant que 
technique juridique,
May 1997, pp 25
44. PAUL PIERSON 
Increasing Returns, Path 
Dependence and the Study of 
Politics,
June 1997, pp 47
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
fX:\
%
%
*03 0\^VV
&
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
